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The U.K.’s Rocky Road
to Stability
A
t the end of 2004, the United Kingdom will have
had positive economic growth for 50 consecutive
quarters, a record unmatched in its half-century of
quarterly GDP data. Over those 50 quarters, inflation has
been steady, averaging around 2.5 percent. These achieve-
ments represent the culmination of major overhaul of the
U.K. economic policy framework over the past 25 years.
By the mid-1970s, the U.K. had drifted away from
allowing markets to allocate resources. The public sector,
which had taken over several major industries in the 1940s,
extended its ownership of companies in the 1970s. Govern-
ment spending hovered near 50 percent of GDP. The growth
of the public sector was accompanied by onerous regula-
tions and taxes on private-sector activity. Although U.K.
membership in the European Union (since 1973) exposed
firms to greater competition, further benefits of member-
ship for U.K. residents were stifled by foreign exchange
controls that made travel and investment overseas prohibi-
tive. On taxes, Joseph Pechman observed: “The 1978-79
top-bracket rate of 83 percent on earned income was close
to the highest in the world; the top rate of 98 percent on
investment income was surpassed only in Algeria…”1
Price stability was a casualty of postwar U.K. policies.
Inflation averaged 13.4 percent in the 1970s and peaked at
over 25 percent in 1975. This failure reflected the attach-
ment by policymakers to nonmonetary views of inflation
and their consequent reliance on wage/price controls
instead of monetary policy to handle inflation.2
The postwar pattern of U.K. policymaking came to be
summarized as “stop-go”—a phrase that reflects the econ-
omic instability that occurred, but falsely implies major pol-
icy changes. In fact, policy differences between successive
administrations were minor; instability occurred because
the consensus policies themselves were destabilizing.
The Thatcher government, elected in 1979, quickly
abolished foreign exchange controls and the highest mar-
ginal tax rates, and more gradually implemented reform of
the labor market and privatization. These reforms seem
to have helped reverse some of the decline in the U.K.’s
productivity growth after 1973. Another fundamental
change was the rejection of price controls in favor of a
strict monetary policy for fighting inflation, which brought
inflation down to an average of 5.1 percent in the decade
after 1982. On government expenditure, Thatcher’s contri-
bution was not lower spending but, instead, sustaining
the reduction in the ratio of government outlays to GDP
achieved by the prior (Callaghan) administration. In her
second term, Thatcher lost interest in macroeconomic
policy and permitted the Treasury to reinstate a policy of
fixed exchange rates. The subsequent boom and monetary
tightening meant that when Thatcher left office in 1990,
inflation was near double digits while unemployment and
the government spending/GDP ratio were climbing again.
The more durable period of growth alongside low infla-
tion followed the resumption of floating exchange rates
and the introduction of inflation targeting in 1992, which
was reinforced by the independence conferred on the Bank
of England in 1997. Monetary policy deliberations have
been promptly disclosed to the public since 1994 and since
mid-1997 have consisted of monthly minutes of the Bank
of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, the U.K. equiva-
lent of the Federal Open Market Committee.
With control of inflation now institutionalized through
inflation targeting, a principal economic concern for the
U.K. is how fiscal and regulatory policies can stimulate
productivity growth. After initial fiscal restraint, which
in 1998 brought government spending and taxes simulta-
neously below 40 percent of GDP for the first time in
decades, the Blair government launched major expenditure
programs that have so far produced higher prices for gov-
ernment output but little apparent increase in output vol-
umes. The government will need to ensure that its recently
extended command over resources does not hamper private-
sector productivity. The U.K. will also need to use its mem-
bership in the European Union to encourage a regulatory
environment that is favorable for growth.
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